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Sharon N. Freytag *, James P. George** and Michelle E McCoy***
ONFLICTS of laws occur when foreign elements appear in a law-
suit. Nonresident litigants, incidents in sister states or foreign coun-
tries, and lawsuits from other jurisdictions represent foreign
elements that may create problems of judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, or
recognition of foreign judgments, respectively. This Article reviews Texas
conflicts of law during the Survey period from late 1988 through 1989, dis-
cussing cases from Texas state and federal courts. The Article excludes
cases involving federal-state conflicts, criminal law, intrastate matters such
as subject matter jurisdiction and venue, and conflicts in time, such as the
applicability of prior or subsequent law within a state.
During the Survey period, judicial jurisdiction developments included the
Fifth Circuit's adherence to the stream of commerce standard of Bean
Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp.,' despite its rejection by a plural-
ity of the United States Supreme Court.2 Also in Schlobohm v. Schapiro,3
the Texas Supreme Court modified the Texas jurisdictional formula to paral-
lel the federal constitutional standard.4 The Texas formula, previously set
out in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. ,5 specifically provided for the assertion of spe-
cific jurisdiction only when the nonresident defendant's acts or transactions
in Texas gave rise to or were connected with the cause of action. In Schlo-
bohm, the court recognized that the previous formula was incomplete be-
cause it did not reflect the concept of general jurisdiction. The court
therefore modified the O'Brien v. Lanpar formula to state that jurisdiction
may be exercised over a nonresident defendant with continuous and system-
atic contacts with Texas, even if the cause of action does not arise from a
specific contact.6
Choice of law analysis continued its development under the most signifi-
*B.S., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Southern Methodist
University, Attorney, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Oklahoma State University; J.D., University of Tulsa, LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity, Attorney, Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.S., Louisiana State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney,
Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
1. 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
3. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
4. 784 S.W.2d at 358. See infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
new Texas standard.
5. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
6. 784 S.W.2d at 358.
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cant relationship test, with noteworthy decisions involving usury, statutes of
limitation, the act of state doctrine, and the requisites for pleading foreign
law. The area of foreign judgments endured a third ruling that the Uniform
Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act 7 is unconstitutional,
based on its failure to provide expressly for a plenary hearing prior to
enforcement.
I. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
To assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must ensure
that the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and that juris-
diction has been properly invoked through valid service of process on the
defendant. In diversity cases a determination of amenability necessitates two
inquiries: (1) Is the defendant amenable to service of process under a long-
arm statute or rule of the forum state? (2) Is the assertion of jurisdiction
consistent with due process?8
A. Texas Federal Courts
In Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,9 the Fifth Circuit upheld per-
sonal jurisdiction over a Yugoslavian corporation that supplied asbestos to
an American broker who subsequently sold the asbestos to a Texas com-
pany. Various plaintiffs brought products liability actions against twenty-
one companies, including the Yugoslavian corporation Jugometal Enterprise
for Import and Export of Ores and Metals ("Jugometal"). Jugometal had
allegedly supplied asbestos to the Uvalde Rock Asphalt Company in Hous-
ton from the 1950s through the early 1970s. Marcus Irving, a former
Uvalde employee and one of the 106 plaintiffs, sued Jugometal under theo-
ries of strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty for respiratory inju-
ries allegedly linked to asbestos exposure that occurred during his
employment at Uvalde. The district court dismissed each of the actions
against Jugometal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 10
Yugoslavian trade laws prohibited the company that mined the raw asbes-
tos from selling the asbestos in foreign countries. Jugometal, having the nec-
essary export licenses, purchased asbestos from the mining company and
sold it to Huxley Development Company ("Huxley"), an American broker.
Uvalde bought the asbestos from Huxley."I Although no evidence indicated
7. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rev. Code Ann §§ 36.001 - 36.008 (Vernon 1986).
8. The two inquiries essentially collapse into one because the Texas Supreme Court has
interpreted the Texas long arm statute to reach to the very limits of due process. U-Anchor
Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court divides the constitutional inquiry into two parts: whether
the non-resident defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state
and whether the exercise of jurisdiction resulted in fair play and substantial justice. Asahi, 480
U.S. 102, 108-09, 113 (1987).
9. 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 83, 107 2.Ed. 49.
10. Id. at 384.
11. Jugometal supplied about 5,000 metric tons of asbestos to Uvalde each year between
1956 and 1970. "These purchases represented all of Uvalde's asbestos supply during this
time." Id. at 384.
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that Jugometal knew Uvalde was the ultimate purchaser, Jugometal shipped
asbestos to Houston approximately every two months for fifteen years. 12
The contract between Jugometal and Huxley required Jugometal to ship the
asbestos to Houston, in bags labeled "Houston-Huxley," and the parties
agreed to split the cost of quality control testing at a Houston laboratory.
The contract between Jugometal and the mining company stated that
Jugometal would store and ship the asbestos, prepare invoices, collect pay-
ment, and transfer payment to the mining company after deducting a one
percent commission.
Reviewing the district court's dismissal of the action against Jugometal13
the Fifth Circuit noted that plaintiff Irving had the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction over Jugometal under a two prong test.14 First,
Jugometal must have had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas, the fo-
rum state. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction over Jugometal must not have
offended "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 15
In assessing Jugometal's contacts with Texas, the Fifth Circuit discussed
the stream of commerce theory established in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson 16 and upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.17 The Fifth Circuit observed that Jus-
tice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi rejected the conclusion of Bean
Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp. 18 that mere foreseeability that a
product in the stream of commerce would find its way to the forum state
established personal jurisdiction.19 Nonetheless, an equal number of justices
in Asahi refused to require additional conduct beyond that considered suffi-
cient under the Bean Dredging standard.20 As a result, the Fifth Circuit
applied the Bean Dredging foreseeability test and rejected Jugometal's argu-
ment that its role in the supply chain was too minor to support the district
12. "[Ihe contract between Huxley and Jugometal, dated November 24, 1959... identi-
fied Jugometal as the "seller" and Huxley as the "buyer" of the asbestos." Id.
13. Initially, the Fifth Circuit noted that to establish personal jurisdiction the plaintiff
must satisfy both the Texas long arm statute and the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 385. As the Texas long arm statute, TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986), "reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements
of due process will permit," the Fifth Circuit proceeded directly to the due process analysis.
Irving, 864 F.2d at 384 (citing Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.
1985)).
14. Irving, 864 F.2d at 384. The court observed that the plaintiffs need only present a
prima facie case for personal jurisdiction because Jugometal predicated its motion to dismiss
solely on affidavits and depositions, and the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Id.
15. Id. at 385 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
16. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World Wide Volkswagen Corp., the Court decided that asser-
tion of jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation is proper if the corporation delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum state. Id. at 298. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs'
unilateral action of driving their car into Oklahoma was sufficient to establish personal juris-
diction in Oklahoma over the New York dealer and the East Coast wholesaler who sold the
car. Id. at 295-96.
17. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
18. 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1984).
19. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110.
20. Id. at 116-21.
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court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce doc-
trine.21 The Fifth Circuit held that Jugometal's marketing efforts, 22 com-
bined with its explicit ties to Houston, should have given Jugometal reason
to anticipate use of its product in Texas and reason to expect it could be
brought into a Texas court.23
The court focused on the following facts in upholding personal jurisdic-
tion over the Yugoslavian corporation: Jugometal held itself out as the seller
under the contract with Huxley; Jugometal conveyed the asbestos to a
freight forwarder for shipment to Houston; Jugometal shared the cost of
quality control testing for a Houston lab; Jugometal was debited for bag-
cleaning charges at a Houston company; and Jugometal accepted and
processed payments for the asbestos. The fact that Jugometal did not know
that Uvalde was the ultimate user did not defeat the district court's exercise
of jurisdiction.24
Applying the second prong of the personal jurisdiction test, the court con-
cluded that subjecting Jugometal to the jurisdiction of the Texas court did
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.25 The
court considered the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum
state, the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, the judicial
system's interest in efficient resolution of controversies, and the states'
shared interest in promoting fundamental social policies.26 The fact that the
litigation involved 106 consolidated asbestos claims against twenty-one de-
fendants for injuries arising in Texas and linked to asbestos distributed by
Jugometal justified the heavy burden placed upon the Yugoslavian corpora-
tion in defending these lawsuits in Texas.27
In WNS, Ina v. Farrow28 the Fifth Circuit held that a Texas district court
could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Georgia residents
who obtained a franchise from a Texas corporation. 29 In March of 1986 the
Farrows, residents of Georgia, contacted WNS at its Houston office to apply
21. Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1989). As
predicted by commentators, the decision in Asahi has raised questions about the direction of
the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction.
22. "Jugometal authorized Huxley [to find] American buyers for Yugoslavian asbestos
throughout the United States. Although this effort produced only one buyer ... Uvalde,
Jugometal nonetheless derived economic benefits from it and placed no geographic limits on
Huxley's efforts." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 384. The court noted that "even a nonresident defendant's out-of-state activities
can establish the necessary minimum contacts if those activities have 'reasonably foreseeable
consequences' within the forum state." Id. at 386 (citing Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge
Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1083). The court pointed out that "Jugometal's contacts
with Houston gave Jugometal more reason to foresee that its product was being sold in
[Texas]." Id. at 387.
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1988)).
27. Id. The court noted that the litigation involved "Texas plaintiffs using a local forum to
pursue compensation for alleged injuries that occurred in Texas." Id. at 388.
28. 884 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1989).
29. Id. at 204.
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for a Deck the Walls franchise.30 The Farrows traveled to Houston later
that month to meet with WNS employees for a formal interview31 and to
negotiate a franchise agreement.32 After returning to Georgia, the Farrows
mailed two cashiers checks to WNS to satisfy their financial obligations
under the franchise agreement. Mrs. Farrow later attended a training semi-
nar in Houston to learn how to operate a Deck the Walls franchise.
WNS sent the Farrows a copy of the franchise agreement, but only Mrs.
Farrow signed it.33 When WNS received the agreement containing only one
signature, WNS informed the Farrows of its understanding that both Far-
rows were applying for the franchise. Nonetheless, Mrs. Farrow alone oper-
ated the Georgia Deck the Walls franchise until April 1987 when WNS
discovered that Mr. Farrow had been operating a competing framing store in
Georgia in violation of the franchise agreement. WNS took possession of the
franchise and ultimately brought a fraud and breach of contract action
against the Farrows in Texas state district court. WNS alleged that the Far-
rows misrepresented their intentions when they applied for the Deck the
Walls franchise. The Farrows removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, which granted the Farrows' mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.34
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered only whether the district court
had specific jurisdiction over the Farrows because of the Farrows' contacts
with Texas.35 To satisfy its burden of establishing contacts sufficient to in-
voke jurisdiction,36 WNS submitted an affidavit by its director of store plan-
ning.37 Because the court decided the jurisdictional issue on the basis of
30. "WNS is a Texas corporation located in Houston which licenses the Deck the Walls
trade name and franchises a comprehensive system for opening and operating a Deck the
Walls store." Id. at 201.
31. WNS required each applicant to travel to Houston for an extensive formal interview
as part of the process of becoming a Deck the Walls franchisee.
32. "The Farrows [contended] that they traveled to Houston merely for a 'social visit' to
learn more about the virtues of the company from the WNS staff. WNS assert[ed], however,
that in addition to negotiating and structuring a franchise agreement ... the Farrows also
completed an application for a Georgia franchise of Deck the Walls." Id. WNS also claimed
that the parties negotiated specific terms for a franchise agreement, a loan/lease agreement,
and a sublease agreement.
33. Following the one-week training session in Houston, which Mr. Farrow did not at-
tend, Mrs. Farrow also signed an authorization to occupy certain leased premises for the Deck
the Walls franchise in Georgia which designated both the Farrows as franchisees. Mr. Farrow
did not sign the document.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 202-203. Specific jurisdiction is established when the lawsuit arises out of, or
relates to, the defendant's specific contacts in the forum. In contrast, general jurisdiction re-
fers to jurisdiction over defendants who maintain "continuous and systematic" contacts in a
particular forum. InterFirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1988),
opinion withdrawn in part on denial of rehearing on other grounds, 853 F.2d 292 (1988).
36. The party who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court bears the burden of
establishing sufficient contacts with the forum state by the nonresident defendant.' WNS, 884
F.2d at 203 (citing D.J. Invs., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d
542, 545 (5th Cir. 1985)).
37. The affidavit of the director of Store Planning stated:
At all times during the negotiation and interview process, the training process,
and the transfer of possession and operations... until Mrs. Farrow contacted us
in the latter part of May, 1986 stating otherwise, WNS acted upon the belief,
1990]
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facts contained in the affidavits, WNS only had to present a prima facie case
of personal jurisdiction. 38 WNS argued that it met this standard by alleging
that the Farrows made fraudulent misrepresentations in Texas and by show-
ing that the Farrows had substantial contractual connections with Texas by
virtue of their negotiations with WNS concerning the Deck the Walls
franchise. The district court rejected WNS' argument, reasoning that be-
cause this case concerned future performance and the alleged breach oc-
curred in Georgia, WNS had to show that the Farrows did not intend to
keep their promises to WNS at the time they applied to become Deck the
Walls franchisees. 39 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that WNS estab-
lished a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction by alleging, with affidavit
support, that the Farrows committed fraud through their activities in
Texas.4o
In Schwegmann Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons,41 the Fifth Circuit upheld
a Louisiana district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Simmons, a
Texan who invested in a limited partnership formed to purchase real estate
in Texas. The trial court had entered summary judgment against Simmons,
holding him liable for the face value of his promissory note, together with
interest, attorneys' fees and costs. Simmons appealed, contending that the
Louisiana district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
The partnership in which Simmons invested had as its general partner a
corporation whose principal office was located in Shreveport, Louisiana.
Simmons' participation in the venture was memorialized by a subscription
agreement that was delivered to the Louisiana general partner and a promis-
sory note payable to the Louisiana general partner. The general partner sub-
sequently endorsed Simmons' note to a related company, which in turn
endorsed Simmons' note to the Bank of Commerce of Shreveport, Louisiana,
as security for a loan. Schwegmann Bank & Trust Company agreed to par-
ticipate in the loan, and Schwegmann acquired the promissory note in 1986
based on the Farrows'fraudulent representation at the interview in Houston and
subsequent thereto, that both the Farrows were applying in good faith for a Deck
the Walls franchise which they intended to operate in compliance with the terms
of the Franchise Agreement.
884 F.2d at 203 (emphasis in original). Further, in their original petition, WNS specifically
alleged fraud on the part of the Farrows in representing to WNS in Houston that they desired
to become Deck the Walls franchisees. The plaintiff also listed numerous contacts by the
Farrows with WNS in Texas.
38. Id. The party who bears the burden need only present a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction; proof by a preponderance of evidence is not required. Moreover, on a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint of the
plaintiff must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the affidavits of the
parties must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 204. (citing D.J. Invs,, 754 F.2d at 545-
46).
39. Id. While the Farrows disputed the fact that they did not intend to keep their promise
to WNS at the time they applied to become Deck the Walls franchisees, WNS maintained
otherwise. For the purposes of determining whether the district court had personal jurisdic-
tion, the court favored the version of the facts advanced by WNS. Id. (citing D.J. Invn, 754
F.2d at 545-46).
40. Id. at 203. The Court did not address whether the Farrow's contacts with Texas
satisfied the due process requirement of "minimum contacts."
41. 880 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1989).
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after the Bank of Commerce began to experience financial difficulties.
Although Simmons initially attempted to relinquish his partnership interest,
he later changed his mind and made interest payments on the note to
Schwegmann in Louisiana until April 1987.
In an action by Schwegmann to enforce the note, the district court found
that it was neither unreasonable nor unfair to require Simmons to defend
this claim in Louisiana because he had purposefully availed himself of the
benefits of conducting business in that state.42 The court reasoned that be-
cause Simmons knew his note would be used as collateral for financing the
partnership, he could have foreseen that the note would be negotiated to a
Louisiana entity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed,43 emphasizing that Simmons
delivered his subscription agreement to Shreveport and gave the Louisiana
general partner his power of attorney.44 Moreover, Simmons' promissory
note provided that it would be governed in all respects by Louisiana law and
that all principal and interest payments on the note would be made in
Shreveport.
In Tandy Corp. v. Comus International, Inc.45 a Texas federal district
court held that it had neither specific nor general in personam jurisdiction
over a New Jersey corporation.46 The case involved a dispute over the rights
to sell a device for testing telephone lines. Plaintiff Tandy, a Delaware cor-
poration doing business in Texas through its primary headquarters in Fort
Worth, has approximately 6,000 Radio Shack outlets throughout the United
States.47 Tandy sold line testing devices in its Radio Shack outlets, which
were manufactured by a Korean company under the trade name "Archer."
Defendant Comus owned a patent covering a similar device.48 Tandy
brought a declaratory judgment action in a Texas federal district court to
have the Comus patent declared invalid.49 Comus is a New Jersey corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in New Jersey. It has no Texas office
and is not licensed to conduct business in Texas. Comus' only Texas activity
consisted of selling mercury switches to Tandy and another Texas pur-
chaser.50 Comus moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, con-
42. Id. at 840 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 704 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
46. Id. at 119.
47. Two hundred and ten of these outlets are in New Jersey, the location of defendant
Comus' primary place of business.
48. Comus, however, didnot manufacture or sell the products. The patent had been li-
censed, and the licensees of the patent distributed the product directly to the public. None of
the licensees were in the State of Texas, nor were they subsidiaries or affiliates of Comus.
49. Comus filed a patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey contending that the production, use, and sale of the Archer telephone
line tester infringed upon its patent. "Although Tandy's action in [Texas] was filed five days
before Comus' New Jersey action, service was made on the same day for both [actions]. Co-
mus had no notice of Tandy's action prior to being served." Id. at 116-17. In the Texas
federal district court, Tandy also sought "to enjoin Comus from instituting further proceed-
ings." Id. at 116.
50. Comus manufactures mercury switches. These switches are sold to companies who
place the switches in equipment, which is then sold to the general public. "Tandy is one of
1990]
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tending that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas.51
The district court concluded that it could not exercise specific jurisdiction
because the mercury switches sold by Comus in Texas had no connection to
the telephone testing device at issue. Since the court lacked specific jurisdic-
tion, it examined the nature of Comus' contacts with Texas to determine
whether Comus had continuous and systematic contacts to satisfy the due
process requirements for general jurisdiction.5 2
Comus was not licensed to do business in Texas, nor did it maintain any
business office, bank accounts, phone listings, or salespeople in Texas. It did
not lease or own Texas property, and its limited advertising was in national
registers not specifically directed at Texas customers. Comus' only contact
with Texas involved sales of mercury switches to Tandy and one other Texas
customer. The court thus concluded that Comus had not engaged in contin-
uous and systematic activity in Texas sufficient to support general
jurisdiction. 53
B. Texas State Courts
1. Amenability
In Schlobohm v. Schapiro,54 the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the
Texas formula for personal jurisdiction was incomplete and modified the
formula to ensure compliance with the federal constitutional standard. 55
these customers and received approximately 3,000 switches per month ... [at] a Tandy repack-
aging facility in Fort Worth. Comus' other Texas customer received approximately 3,000-
5,000 switches per year." Id. at 117.
51. Alternatively, Comus moved to transfer the action to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.
52. Id. at 118 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S 408,414
(1984)). In Tandy the court discussed two Fifth Circuit decisions that considered the contacts
necessary for a district court to invoke its general jurisdiction. Id. See Petroleum Helicopters,
Inc. v. Avco Corp., 804 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendants' activities in forum state did not
establish general jurisdiction); Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986)
(defendants' contacts in toto sufficient to constitute continuous and systematic contacts re-
quired by due process).
53. Tandy, 704 F.Supp. at 119. As the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction over Co-
mus, the court ordered the case transferred to the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey for possible consolidation with the action filed by Comus in New Jersey. Id. If
a federal district court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court may transfer the
action to any other federal district court having jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988).
54. 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
55. The three parts of the Texas formula as enunciated in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399
S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), track the elements of the jurisdictional tests that have evolved in
United States Supreme Court decisions. The first part of the Texas formula reflects the re-
quirement that a defendant purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the forum and reason-
ably expect to be called to court there. See Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The third part of the
Texas formula reflects the fair play and substantial justice prong of the jurisdictional test and
specifies the factor that Texas considers important in the fair play analysis, which is separate
and distinct from the minimum contacts analysis. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Prior to Schlobohm, the second part of the Texas formula reflected
the concept of specific jurisdiction by focusing on whether the cause of action arose from, or
was connected with, the purposeful act or transaction addressed in the first prong. O'Brien,
399 S.W.2d at 342. See note 65 infra.
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Schlobohm involved an action against a Pennsylvania defendant for nonpay-
ment of rent. In July of 1984, Rolf Schapiro ("Schapiro"), a Pennslvania
resident, invested $10,000 in a corporation named Hangers, Inc., formed by
his son Douglas, a resident of Dallas, to establish dry cleaning stores in office
buildings. Schapiro received stock in the corporation and became its sole
director. Although Schapiro did not participate in the incorporation, he
conducted Hangers' first meeting in Dallas. Schapiro also guaranteed some
of the leases for the cleaning outlets.
In late 1984, Schlobohm leased a building to Hangers for a term of 60
months. Douglas, as president of Hangers, negotiated and signed the lease.
Schapiro did not participate in the negotiations, did not guarantee this par-
ticular lease, and had no personal contact with Schlobohm either prior to or
during the lease term.
During this same time, in November of 1984, Schapiro loaned $30,000 of
his personal funds to buy equipment for expansion of Hangers. Schapiro
later visited Dallas and signed a promissory note to obtain financing for the
rest of the plant. Throughout Schapiro's involvement with Hangers, he fre-
quently provided funds to cover payroll and other expenses and eventually
became the sole shareholder and sole director of the corporation. Schapiro
discontinued his relationship with Hangers, however, when the business be-
gan to decline.
In August 1986, Hangers ceased paying rent on the building leased from
Schlobohm. Schlobohm then brought suit for nonpayment of rentals from
August 1986 to the end of the lease term in 1989. Schapiro specially ap-
peared, and the trial court sustained Schapiro's challenge to jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Schapiro's contacts with Texas
were too minimal to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction.56 Because
Schapiro was not a party to the lease between Hangers and Schlobohm, the
court began its personal jurisdiction analysis by inquiring whether
Schapiro's contacts with Texas constituted the kind of continuous and sys-
tematic contacts that would justify the assertion of general jurisdiction.57
Schlobohm argued that Schapiro's extensive commercial transactions in
Texas were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.5 The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that Schapiro's trips to Dallas in August
1984 and in January 1986 could not be regarded as contacts of a continuous
56. 759 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988), ree'd, 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990).
57. 759 S.W.2d at 473 (citing Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 735 S.W.2d 662, 663
(rex. 1987)).
58. Schapiro's contacts as set out by the court of appeals were as follows:
1. On August 15, 1984, as the sole director of Hangers, Schapiro conducted the first meet-
ing of the directors at the corporation's registered office in Dallas.
2. Schapiro remained the sole director until his resignation at the end of 1985.
3. In November 1984, Schapiro loaned Hangers money for the down payment on the
equipment to be installed in the premises leased from Schlobohm.
4. In December 1984 or January 1985, Schapiro became the sole stockholder in Hangers.
5. On January 18, 1985, Schapiro came to Dallas and obtained a $136,702.10 loan in his
1990]
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and systematic nature.59 The court further stated that although Schapiro
came to Dallas to obtain a loan on behalf of Hangers in January 1985, that
single contact, unconnected with Schlobohm's claim for amounts due under
the lease, could not support jurisdiction over Schapiro.60 Justice Hecht, dis-
senting, concluded that Schapiro conducted himself in such a way that he
could reasonably have expected to answer for his conduct in a Texas court.6'
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis of whether the lower courts
properly dismissed the action by noting that the Texas long arm statute au-
thorized the exercise ofjurisdiction.62 The court then turned to the constitu-
tional inquiry. 63 After summarizing the federal constitutional test of due
process,64 the court compared the Texas formula for exercising personal
jurisdiction. 65 Although the three part Texas formula reflected the pur-
individual capacity with MBank to purchase the equipment. All equipment leased by Schapiro
to Hangers was collateral for the loan.
6. Schapiro continually deposited money in the Hangers' account for the payroll and ex-
penses.
7. In January 1986, Schapiro came to Dallas with his wife to visit his children "hoping we
could get some information [about Hangers]."
8. On March 1986, while in Pennsylvania, Schapiro entered into a security agreement with
MBank to secure Hangers' debts. Schapiro assigned $10,000 from his personal account to
cover Hangers' insufficient funds checks.
Also, Schapiro took his medical specialty board examination in Dallas approximately 25
years ago and attended a workshop in San Antonio representing his Pennsylvania hospital.
759 S.W.2d at 472-73.
59. Id. at 473; See Helicopteros Nationales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17
(1984).
60. Schlobohm, 759 S.W.2d at 473.
61. Id. at 474-476. Justice Hecht stated:
On this record I cannot imagine how Schapiro could have invested hundreds
of thousands of dollars in a Dallas business run by his son, served as the sole
director and shareholder of the corporation for most of the period in question,
advanced the business money on a weekly or monthly basis for almost two
years, had "endless communications" with the business, made two trips to Dal-
las to see the business, sent his accountant to inspect it two other times, negoti-
ated a $136,000 loan from a Dallas bank to buy equipment to lease the business,
guaranteed some of the business' leases, and kept the corporate records with his
personal attorney and never reasonably expected that he might be subject to suit
in Texas .... I see nothing unfair or offensive in requiring Schapiro to answer in
a Dallas court for the actions he freely took here.
Id. at 476. Justice Hecht, now a member of the Texas Supreme Court, did not take part in that
court's decision in Schlobohm.
62. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. art. §§ 17.041-.069 (Vernon 1986). The
court found that jurisdiction was authorized by the "other acts" language of §§ 17.042 which
placed Schapiro within the "doing business" requirement of the long arm statute.
63! Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
64. Id. at 357-58.
65. The Texas formula provides that in order for a Texas court to have specific jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant:
1. The nonresident defendant or forum corporation must purposefully do some act or con-
summate some transaction in the forum state;
2. The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and
3. The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of
the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protec-
tion of the law of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the
situation.
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966).
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poseful availment component of the minimum contacts analysis and the fair
play and substantial justice prong of the federal constitutional standard, the
second part of the Texas formula reflected only the c6ncept of specific juris-
diction, without specifically including the concept of general jurisdiction.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that this incomplete Texas formula could
give litigants the false idea that jurisdiction may be premised only on an act
or transaction of the defendant in Texas that gives rise to a cause of action.66
The court thus modified the Texas formula to indicate that jurisdiction may
also arise from the defendant's continuous and systematic contacts with
Texas, even if the cause of action does not arise from a specific contact. 67
The Texas Supreme Court observed that this modification does not change
Texas law but simply clarifies that jurisdiction may be based upon either
single or numerous contacts between the forum and the defendant.68
Applying the modified standard to the facts of Schlobohm, the court ini-
tially analyzed the second part of the formula, whether jurisdiction was pre-
mised on continuing and systematic activity or on a cause of action that
'arose from isolated activity.69 The court noted that this inquiry did not al-
low defendants to select certain contacts they believe pertinent to the juris-
dictional issue; rather, all contacts must be considered in determining
whether there is a pattern of continuous and systematic activity. Under this
approach, the court concluded that Schapiro had a continuous relationship
with Texas. 70
The court's second inquiry focused on whether Schapiro purposefully di-
rected his activities toward Texas.71 The Texas Supreme Court, after con-
sidering Schapiro's extensive involvement in Texas, found it difficult to
believe that Schapiro could have been surprised by litigation in Texas and
held that Schapiro clearly purposefully availed himself of the benefits of
Texas law.72 Having determined that Schapiro had the requisite minimum
contacts, the court further held that the exercise of jurisdiction over
Schapiro by a Texas court would not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.73 It, therefore, reversed the decision of the court of
66. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
67. Id. The second prong of the Texas test now reads:
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or
transaction. Even if the cause of action does not arise from a specific contact,jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continu-
ing and systematic.
Id. at 358.
68. Id. at 358.
69. Schlobohm relied on Schapiro's numerous and continuous actions to support his posi-
tion that the negotiation and signing of the lease, an activity in which Schapiro did not directly
participate, nevertheless subjected him to jurisdiction. Schapiro urged the court to consider
only certain "primary" contacts in determining whether he was subject to jurisdiction in a
Texas court: his negotiation for the equipment loan and his status as sole stockholder of Hang-
ers. Id. at 359.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.)




appeals and remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits.74
The modification or clarification of the personal jurisdiction standard by
the Texas Supreme Court may help to prevent its misapplication. The court
of appeals in Schlobohm commented that Schapiro's acts in the forum, while
numerous, were unconnected with the cause of action and held that the acts
were not continuous and systematic. Perhaps Schlobohm will encourage
Texas courts to apply the general jurisdiction analysis properly.
In Southern Clay Products, Inc. v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance,
Ltd. 75 English China Clays, an English company, obtained a liability insur-
ance policy from Guardian, an English insurance company with its principal
place of business in England. The insurance policy covered English China
Clays and its American subsidiaries for liability occurring anywhere in the
world. 76 Southern Clay, one of the subsidiaries and a Texas corporation,
had its principal place of business in Texas.
A Southern Clay employee died in an employment-related accident in
Texas. The deceased's family filed wrongful death actions against Southern
Clay in federal and state courts in Texas. Guardian refused to participate in
the settlement, and Southern Clay Products, along with English China
Clays, English China Clays Overseas Investments, Ltd., and Gonzales Clay
Corporation (the "Clays"), brought suit against Guardian in a Texas court
to enforce the insurance agreement. 77
Guardian specially appeared, claiming that the insurance agreement was
strictly between two English companies and was negotiated and imple-
mented in England. Guardian therefore claimed it had insufficient contacts
with Texas, and the trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that
Guardian negated every possible basis for personal jurisdiction. 78
On appeal, the court applied the O'Brien three-pronged test to determine
the constitutional reach of the court's jurisdiction over defendants with only
a single or few contacts with Texas.79 The court of appeals noted that the
insurer's agreement to cover accidents occurring anywhere in the world in-
cluded those occurring in Texas and indicated that Guardian intended to
74. Id.
75. 762 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ granted).
76. The insurance policy was issued in 1980. A 1981 endorsement to the policy extended
coverage to companies within the United States, including Southern Clay. Guardian provided
insurance to the American subsidiaries of English China Clays with the understanding that the
subsidiaries would obtain underlying insurance from American insurers. Southern Clay ob-
tained underlying coverage from United States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire"). Dur-
ing the course of the underlying lawsuit, Southern Clay settled with the family of the deceased,
and U.S. Fire satisfied the claims. U.S. Fire, being subrogated to the rights of the Clays, was
the real party in interest in the Texas insurance suit.
77. The Clays claimed that Guardian was the primary insurer and should therefore reim-
burse U.S. Fire for the amounts paid in the settlement of the underlying lawsuit. Guardian
claimed that its liability extended only to excess coverage.
78. Id. at 929. Under Texas law, a nonresident defendant has the burden to negate all
bases of personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d
434, 438 (Tex. 1982)).




serve the Texas market.80 The court concluded its jurisdictional analysis
with a discussion of foreseeability and acceptance of the risk of litigation in a
particular forum. 81 The court stated that Guardian had assumed the risk of
accidents occurring in foreign jurisdictions because Guardian had specifi-
cally agreed to cover U.S. subsidiaries. Therefore, Guardian had sufficient
notice that a substantial subject of insurance was regularly present in the
United States and sufficient notice that it might be brought into any court
where a United States subsidiary was located and a covered accident
occurred.8 2
The court in Guardian appears to have exercised specific jurisdiction;
thus, the decision in Schlobohm concerning general jurisdiction should not
affect the Guardian holding.8 3 Notably, despite the Schlobohm court's con-
cern that the second prong of O'Brien might lead litigants to conclude that a
cause of action must arise from or be connected with a foreign defendant's
contacts with Texas, the Guardian court acknowledged the viability of the
concept of general jurisdiction in Texas before the Texas Supreme Court
clarified the O'Brien test.84
In Luker v. LukerIs the Texarkana court of appeals held that mere posses-
sion of a Texas driver's license does not constitute purposeful availment of
the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas.86 The plaintiff, a Texas
resident, while riding in a car driven by the defendant, a Louisiana resident,
was injured in an automobile accident in Louisiana. The plaintiff brought
suit in Texas, and the defendant specially appeared to contest jurisdiction.
80. Id. at 931 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
81. Id. at 930. The court discussed several federal court cases applying the due process
analysis to a nonresident insurance company. See, eg., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding California court's personal jurisdiction over Texas insurer and
discussing fairness of requiring insurer to answer claims in distant forum); Rossman v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832-F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing different types of
insurance as giving rise to varying ranges of foreseeable forums where claim might arise); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (where insured distributes
products nationwide, broad scope of risk is part of insurer's calculations in issuing policy and
insurer should be held to answer in any forum where it could reasonably expect products to be
sold); Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980) (where loss arises from
subject of insurance regularly present in forum and insurer has not limited coverage to speci-
fied jurisdictions, insurer is fairly subject to in personam jurisdiction).
82. Southern Clay, 762 S.W.2d at 929, 932.
83. The Texas Supreme Court has granted the application for writ of error in Guardian.
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays P.L.C., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
495, 496 (1989). The points of error include:
POINT OF ERROR NO. 3
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT GUARDIAN ROYAL SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN
BEING HALED INTO COURT IN TEXAS TO DETERMINE THE
MEANING OF AN ENGLISH POLICY ISSUED IN ENGLAND TO AN
ENGLISH PARENT COMPANY AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES SOLELY ON
THE BASIS THAT THE POLICY PROVIDED WORLDWIDE
COVERAGE.
84. Southern Clay, 762 S.W.2d at 932.
85. 776 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
86. Id. at 625.
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The defendant was licensed to drive in Texas but had not yet obtained a
Louisiana driver's license although she was a Louisiana resident and had
been living in Louisiana for five months prior to the accident. The defendant
drove to her parents' home in Texas, spent the night, and drove the plaintiff
to a doctor's appointment in Louisiana the next morning. The accident oc-
curred during the drive back to Texas. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant purposely availed her-
self of the benefits of Texas because she was operating a motor vehicle by
authority of a Texas driver's license and that Texas could properly entertain
the suit because the defendant transported the plaintiff out of the state with
intent to return her to her home in Texas. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction, 7 noting
that the plaintiff failed to meet the first prong of the three-prong test deter-
mining whether a non-resident defendant is subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion.88 Because mere possession of a Texas driver's license is not a
"purposeful availment," the court could not constitutionally exercise juris-
diction over the defendant. 89
2. Service of Process
In Carjan Corp. v. Sonner90 a nonresident corporation appealed from a
default judgment, alleging that the attempted service of process under the
long arm statute9 was ineffective to subject the corporation to in personam
jurisdiction in Texas. Sonner was injured in Texas at a bowling alley owned
and operated by Caran. The court rejected Carjan's argument that service
should have been made on the person in charge of Caijan's bowling alley92
and determined that service on the Secretary of State was proper.93 The
court found, however, that the subsequent actions of the Secretary of State,
did not comply with the statute.94 The statute requires that upon receiving
87. Id.
88. Id. See supra, notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
89. Luker, 776 S.W.2d at 625. Moreover, the defendant negated all further bases of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The cause of action did not arise out of any act occurring in Texas, and
there was no evidence of continuous and systematic contacts. Although the defendant once
lived in Texas and currently had relatives living in Texas, she travelled to and from Texas only
three or four times a year.
90. 765 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
91. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041 - 17.045 (Vernon 1986). Section
17.044(a)(1) provides for substituted service. If a nonresident corporation does business in
Texas and has failed to appoint an agent for service, service may be accomplished by service on
the Secretary of State. Id § 17.044(a)(1).
92. Carian Corp., 765 S.W.2d at 554. To be authorized to do business in Texas, a foreign
corporation must appoint an agent in Texas for service of process. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT.
ARTs. ANN. arts. 8.01, 8.08 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990). The clear language of the statute
provides that service of process on the person in charge of the nonresident's local place of
business is authorized only if the nonresident is not required by statute to designate or main-
tain an agent for service of process in Texas. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.043
(Vernon 1986). Therefore, service on the person in charge of Carjan's bowling alley was not
authorized.
93. Caran Corp., 765 S.W.2d at 554.
94. Id. at 555.
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process directed to a nonresident corporation, the Secretary of State must
forward the citation to the defendant's home office.95 The record established
that the citation was only sent to defendant's last known mailing address.
Since defendant's last known mailing address was not the same as the home
office address, the court set aside the default judgment because of the Secre-
tary of State's noncompliance with the long arm statute.96
In Bank ofAmerica v. Love 97 the San Antonio court of appeals set aside a
default judgment entered against Bank of America ("the Bank") because the
record did not indicate that process was served on the Bank at its home
office. 98 The plaintiff, a Texas resident, alleged that the Bank could be
served at a post office box address in California. 99 The records of the Secre-
tary of State recited that the citation and petition were sent by certified mail
to the post office box address, without stating that the address was the
Bank's home office address. The return receipt was sent to the Secretary of
State, purportedly bearing the signature of the Bank's agent, but it did not
indicate that the address was that of the Bank's home office. The Bank
failed to file an answer, and the trial court entered a default judgment.
On appeal, the Bank complained that the trial court erred in entering a
default judgment because service was defective and the trial court, therefore,
lacked jurisdiction. The appellate court held that, in order to support a de-
fault judgment following substituted service, the pleadings must allege facts
that, if true, would establish amenability to service of process.1te In addi-
tion, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was served in the manner
required by the statute.101 The court held that because the plaintiff did not
strictly comply with the rules governing substituted service of process, the
default judgment entered by the trial court was void. 102
In Chaves v. Todaro 1 03 a Houston court of appeals set aside a default judg-
ment entered against an individual nonresident defendant.1o4 The Todaros
95. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(a).
96. Caran Corp., 765 S.W.2d at 555. The Court noted that substituted service is valid
only if there has been strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Id (citing Houtex
Managing Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Hardcastle, 735 S.W.2d 520, 522 (rex. App.-Houston [list
Dist.] 1987, writ ref. n.r.e.)). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing compliance with the
long arm statute. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (rex. 1973). There was no
indication in the plaintiff's petition that the address in the petition was Carjan's home office.
Caijan Corp., 765 S.W.2d at 555.
97. 770 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
98. Id. at 891-92.
99. "The Texas long-arm statute provides that a non-resident defendant may be served by
substituted service on the Secretary of State." Id. at 891 (citing Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REm.
CoDE ANN. § 17.044). "The Secretary of State shall require a statement of the non-resident's
name and home office address, and the Secretary shall immediately forward the process to the
non-resident." Id. (citing Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM CODE ANN. § 17.045(a)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court noted that to uphold jurisdiction over the Bank, it must assume that the
post office box described in the pleadings was, in fact, the Bank's home office. Id. The court
could not assume this fact without violating the rule that no presumptions will be indulged in
favor of the validity of a default judgment. Id. at 892.
103. 770 S.W.2d 944 (rex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1989, no writ).
104. Id. at 946.
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filed suit against Chaves seeking a deficiency judgment following Chaves'
default on a promissory note executed in the purchase of an apartment pro-
ject. The Todaros served the original petition on the Secretary of State, who
mailed the citation to Chaves at a designated office address in Brazil.
Chaves did not file an answer, and the trial court entered a default judgment.
On appeal, Chaves argued that the Todaros did not strictly comply with
the Texas long-arm statute105 because the record did not show that the Sec-
retary of State ever required Chaves' home address. The court stated that
when an individual nonresident has been sued, the individual's home address
must be given to the Secretary of State, and a copy of the process must be
mailed to that address. 10 6 Since the Todaros did not strictly comply with
the procedure prescribed by the Texas long-arm statute, the trial court did
not acquire personal jurisdiction over Chaves.107 Accordingly, the appellate
court set aside the default judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court. 1
08
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Camejo v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration 109 the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful death and survival
claims arising out of a diving accident in Brazil." 10 The decedent, a Brazil-
ian citizen and resident, was employed by a Brazilian entity as a diver in
connection with mineral exploration and died in a diving accident in Brazil-
ian territorial waters. His widow, also a Brazilian citizen and resident,
brought an action in Texas based on general maritime law, the Jones Act, I '
and Texas wrongful death and survival statutes.1 12 The district court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Following a discussion of the evolution of forum non conveniens 113 the
105. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106. Chaves, 770 S.W.2d at 946.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 838 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 1381.
111. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
112. Mrs. Camejo originally filed suit against eight defendants in a state district court in
Houston, Texas. One of the defendants removed the suit to a federal district court in Houston
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1602-1611 (1982). The federal district court dismissed one defendant, and the Fifth Circuit
dismissed four of the other defendants prior to oral argument pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the plaintiff and those defendants. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1375. Following the district
court's dismissal of the defendant against whom the federal admiralty claim was asserted, the
plaintiff sought to remand the case to the state district court where it was originally brought.
The Fifth Circuit noted that even if no federal admiralty claim remained in the case, the dis-
trict court still retained pendent jurisdiction over the state claim and could dismiss the state
claims under the doctrine offorum non conveniens. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1377. The remaining
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum of non conveniens, and the court
granted the defendants' motions subject to certain conditions. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1376 n.4
113. Until 1987 the Fifth Circuit applied a modifiedforum non conveniens analysis in admi-
ralty cases. Before addressing the issue offorum non conveniens, a court was to engage in a
choice of law analysis to determine whether American or foreign law applied. If American law
applied, the district court would generally retain jurisdiction, but if foreign law applied, the
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Fifth Circuit noted that it could reverse the district court's dismissal only if
the lower court's actions constituted a clear abuse of discretion.1 14 The Fifth
Circuit held that the defendants clearly met their burden of establishing that
an adequate and available forum existed and that private and public interests
weighed heavily in favor of having the trial in the foreign forum. 1 s
The plaintiff did not dispute the existence of an adequate alternative fo-
rum.' 16 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit turned to the district court's balancing
of the public and private interest factors set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 117 and upheld the district court's
dismissal of the action for several reasons. First, the employer was a Brazil-
ian entity. In addition, Brazil was the scene of the accident and all of the
information regarding the plaintiff's damages was in Brazil. Furthermore,.
compulsory process for Brazilian witnesses was unavailable in a Texas fo-
rum, and the cost of bringing Brazilian witnesses to Texas was very high. In
sum, Brazil had a great interest in determining a case involving the death of
one of its citizens, while Texas had no comparable interest."1 8 The Fifth
Circuit noted that the balance in this case so strongly favored the defend-
ant's position that it had no trouble upholding the district court's refusal to
exercise its jurisdiction to decide the pendent state claims against the re-
maining defendants.1 19
The Fifth Circuit observed in Camejo that the Texas Supreme Court had
court would proceed to the forum non conveniens analysis set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In 1981 the Supreme Court held that a court need not perform a
choice of law analysis before its forum non conveniens analysis. See Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). The Fifth Circuit concluded that its two-prong admiraltyforum
non conveniens analysis was not inconsistent with Piper and continued to approve the two-
prong test until July 21, 1987 when they determined that a uniform approach to forum non-
conveniens analysis "best served litigants and courts." Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1379. They thus
overruled the cases that used a modified analysis for suits under the Jones Act and general
maritime law. Camejo, 838 F.2d 1379 (citing In Re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1164 n.25).
114. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1379. The appellate court's duty is only to "review the lower
court's decision-making process and conclusion and determine if it is reasonable .. not to
perform a de novo analysis." I& (quoting In Re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1167).
115. Id. The defendants submitted detailed motions for dismissal on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, and the plaintiff did not contest any of the defendants' statements regarding
this issue.
116. In determining whether an available and adequate forum exists, the district court
must engage in a two part analysis. First, a foreign forum is "available" when all parties and
the whole case come within the jurisdiction of that forum. Second, a foreign forum is "ade-
quate" when the parties will not lose all their remedies or be treated unfairly, even though they
may receive less benefits than they might receive in an American court. Id. at 1380 (citing In
Re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1165).
117. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Private interest factors include ease of access to sources of proof,
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witness, possibility of view of premises, the enforceability of a judgment if
obtained, and other practical problems of trial. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1380 (citing Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). Public interest factors include administrative
difficulties and the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. Camejo,
838 F.2d at 1380.
118. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1380.
119. Id. at 1381. Although the Supreme Court noted that courts should not disturb the
plaintiff's choice of forum unless the balance strongly favors the defendants, GulfOil, 330 U.S.
at 508, the Supreme Court has also held that a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 267 (1981).
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hinted that it might view § 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code as precluding a forum non conveniens analysis in a personal injury or
wrongful death case filed in Texas.' 20 The Fifth Circuit observed, however,
that such a position would not change the analysis in maritime cases because
state courts must apply the forum non conveniens rule of general maritime
law in any case brought by foreign citizens who invoke admiralty
jurisdiction.12 1
III. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Contracts
In Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp. v. Universal Health Services, Inc.122 the
Dallas court of appeals held that where a contract expressly provided that
disputes would be governed by the laws of a particular state, the provision
would be given effect if the contract bore a "reasonable relation" to the cho-
sen state and there was no countervailing public policy of the forum state. 123
In this case, the contract was executed in Nevada and designated Texas law
as controlling. The court noted that the public policy of the forum state
must be balanced against the parties' right to choose their own law. 124 Be-
cause Texas was the forum and the parties had chosen Texas law, a conflict
between public policy and the choice of law provision did not arise.1 25
In Cook v. Frazier 126 the Fraziers sued for usury when their high-interest
tax shelter was rendered useless by federal income tax reforms. The Fraziers
bought timeshare properties in Utah and Arkansas for personal use, invest-
ment, and tax shelter purposes. The Fraziers formed a husband-and-wife
partnership to hold the properties in order to qualify for a tax deduction.
The contract regarding the Arkansas properties designated Utah law as
controlling. The interest rate on the contracts was 179% for the first 14
years and 45% for the next 16 years. The Fraziers deducted the interest
from their federal tax returns for several years until the deductions were
120. Camejo, 838 F.2d at 1382. On March 28, 1990, after this Article went to press, the
Texas Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of forum non conveniens in personal injury and
death cases. In a 54 ruling in Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. 1990), the
Court held that the language of § 71.031 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
which permits foreign plaintiffs with personal jurisdiction over defendants to seek damages in
Texas courts in cases involving death or personal injury, does not permit a trial court to relin-
quish jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The holding that the Texas
statute supercedes the judicially created doctrine of forum non conveniens prompted seven
separate opinions - Justice Ray for the majority, two concurrences and four dissents. The
dissenters predict that if the Texas Legislature does not rewrite § 71.031 and reinstate the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, Texas will become "the courthouse for the world" and an
"irresistible forum for all mass disaster lawsuits." 786 S.W. 2d at 690, 707. Because of the
restraint of the printing deadline, the Dow Chemical decision cannot be discussed in detail in
this issue of the Texas Survey.
121. Id.
122. 778 S.W.2d 492 ('ex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
123. Id. at 449.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 765 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ.).
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disallowed. When the Fraziers brought an action against the sellers for
usury, the sellers pleaded the inapplicability of Texas usury law because of
the choice of Utah law in both the Utah and Arkansas contracts. Utah had
no applicable usury law, but Texas did. 127 The court held that the parties'
choice of Utah law was reasonable as to the Utah property, but not reason-
able as to the Arkansas properties. 128 The court noted that this result would
have been reached even if the contracts had no choice of law clauses. 129
If the court's decision was fair, 130 fairness was obtained through back-
door reasoning. The court incorrectly quoted Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. 131 as merely holding that "Texas choice of law rules provide that the law
of the state with the most significant relationship to the issues in question
will be applied to resolve those issues."' 132 Duncan does provide that the
most significant relationship test applies to choice of law questions in Texas,
but its holding is limited to those choice of law questions in which the parties
have not made a valid choice of law agreement.1 33 Thus, the Cook court
should have noted that Duncan requires honoring valid choice of law agree-
ments, and then analyzed the parties' choice of Utah law to see if it was
proper in regard to both the Utah and Arkansas properties.
Duncan also mandates depecage, that is, choice of law analysis on an is-
sue-by-issue basis. Duncan, therefore, required the court to analyze the
Utah and Arkansas properties separately. By incorrectly stating the choice
of law rule, the court forced itself to find that Texas had the most significant
relationship, despite the contractual choice of Utah law. The court ulti-
mately reached the correct outcome, however, by noting that Texas honored
valid choice of law agreements as long as reasonably related to the
contract. 134
Although, the court awkwardly applied Texas choice of law rules, it cor-
rectly noted that the parties' choice of Utah law was not itself a connection
with Utah for choice of law purposes. 135 The validity of the parties' choice
of Utah law was upheld as to the Utah properties because of Utah's signifi-
cant connection as the property situs. By the same reasoning, the Arkansas
contract had no connection to Utah because the property in question was in
127. Id. (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987)).
128. Id. at 550.
129. Id. at 551.
130. Although the court reached the same conclusion that it would have had it properly
applied Duncan and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, this is not to say
the result was fair. Because the Fraziers contracted for and intended usurious interest, a better
result would have been to cancel the contract, rather than award the Fraziers a windfall under
Texas usury law for contracts to which they intentionally entered.
131. Cook, 765 S.W.2d 549 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,420-21
(Tex. 1984)). Duncan states that "in all choice of law cases, except those contract cases in
which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue."
Duncan, 665 S:W.2d at 421 (emphasis added).






Arkansas. However, the court arguably erred by discussing the situs of the
properties as providing a choice of law rule. The court cited the maxim of
lex loci rei sitae 136 which provides that title to realty is governed by the law
of the state in which it is located. Although the same result is obtained in
applying the most significant relationship test from Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws sections 6 and 189,137 the maxim's standard was arguably
overruled in Duncan, when the court held that the most significant relation-
ship test would apply to all choice of law issues in Texas courts, other than
those governed by a valid choice of law agreement.
The court properly refuted defendant's invocation of Texas Business and
Commerce Code section 1.105(a),' 38 which would have upheld the parties'
choice of Utah law for the Arkansas properties. The court noted that be-
cause the sale of land was involved, section 1.105(a) did not apply. 139 The
court further noted that even if section 1.105(a) applied, it would not help
the defendant. 140 The fact that section 1.105(a) allowed the parties to
choose the substantive law of another state as shorthand for the terms of
their contract did not mean that the parties could circumvent Texas usury
law by choosing Utah law, which had little or no relation to the contract. 141
In Thomas C. Cook, Inc. v. Rowhanian,14 2 plaintiff Rowhanian sued for
reimbursement of travelers checks that he purchased in Iran and then lost in
New York City. The case was litigated under claims of deceptive trade prac-
tices, implied warranty, and breach of contract, all under Texas law. Plain-
tiff won only on the breach of contract claim. Rowhanian has no choice of
law analysis, and appears in this Survey only because the authors are puz-
zled as to why the court applied Texas law. The only connection to Texas
was that Rowhanian established Texas residency sometime after losing the
checks in New York.143 Rowhanian, however, was not a resident of Texas
when he purchased the travelers checks in Iran. He had not even established
a Texas residence when he lost the checks on an elevator in New York. It
appears that New York law would have been the logical choice, because the
checks were lost in New York and Thomas C. Cook, Inc., had offices in New
York.
The result reached in Rowhanian is appropriate, however, to the extent
that Texas contract law is similar to New York law. However, Rowhanian's
purchase of travelers checks violated an Iranian law forbidding the removal
136. Id. at 550. The court may have felt obligated to rely on the old lex loci standard
because some Texas precedents call for its application. Because the Texas Supreme Court has
apparently chosen to adopt the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW section by
section instead of in toro, there is no clear authority for applying § 189. This left the Cook
court to rely on the older standard.
137. The court cited § 189 as additional support. Id.
138. Cook, 765 S.W.2d at 550-51.
139. Id. at 551.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 774 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1979, writ denied).
143. Conversation with Craig Albiston, Law Offices of Thomas R. Beech (attorney for
Thomas C. Cook, Inc.) Houston, Texas (Jan. 17, 1989).
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of money from Iran. By permitting Rowhanian to prevail on his breach of
contract claim, the court enforced a contract right that was illegal where the
contract was made. This is not to suggest that Iran law was the only possi-
ble choice of law. It does illustrate, however, the hazards of applying Texas
law to cases that lack the minimal connection required by the due process
clause. 144
In Uniwest Mortgage Co. v. Dadecor Condominiums, Ina 145 the parties'
choice of Colorado law to govern a loan was upheld where the lender had a
principal place of business in Colorado, and the payments were made in Col-
orado. 146 Plaintiff sued for usury, arguing that Texas law should apply be-
cause the primary obligor and guarantor were both from Texas. These
contacts were not sufficient to overcome the parties' choice of Colorado law,
thus defeating plaintiff's usury claim.147 Uniwest is noteworthy for its
proper application of Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, which requires that the forum state have a materially greater interest
than the state the parties chose, before forum public policy can defeat the
contractual choice of law. Last year in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 148 the
Texas Supreme Court apparently ignored the Restatement's requirement
that a materially greater interest be present in order to unseat a contractual
choice of law.
In Adams v. Gates Learjet Corp. 149 Kansas law was applied to a suit for
reimbursement of the costs of aircraft modifications made to meet airworthi-
ness requirements.150 The court found that Kansas had the most significant
relationship to the claim,151 reasoning that the manufacturer and designer of
the aircraft, the manufacturers of modification kits, and the Federal Avia-
tion Administration office responsible for overseeing the modifications were
all located in Kansas. 152 In addition to these contacts, the court observed
Kansas's strong interests in having its law govern an issue concerning manu-
facturers located in Kansas.15 3 The court also noted that the application of
Kansas law would result in certainty, predictability, and uniformity.154
Commercial Credit and Control Data Corp. v. Wheeler1 55 applied the rule
that a person who moves to Texas may invoke the Texas statute of limita-
tions to a claim arising out of state, if that person had lived in Texas twelve
144. See, eg., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-20 (1985); Home Insur.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
145. 877 F. 2d 431 (5th Cir. 1989).
146. Id. at 436.
147. Id.
148. 31 Tex. Sup. 1. 616 (1988) (motion for rehearing still under consideration). See
Freytag, Bush & George, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 431, 448
n.136 (1989).
149. 711 F.Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex. 1988).





155. 756 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
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months preceding the filing of the action.1 5 6 In this case, defendants bought
a mobile home in Maryland in 1974 on a 72-month finance agreement. They
sold it in California in 1976 without informing the finance company.
Neither the defendants nor their transferees made further payments on the
mobile home, and the finance company repossessed the mobile home in
1977. Defendants moved to Texas in 1982, and were sued in 1984 by the
finance company for the deficiency on the mobile home debt. Defendants
successfully invoked the four-year Texas limitations period. 157
Duff v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. 158 concerns the act of state doctrine,
a choice of law rule under international law requiring that courts in the
United States recognize the independence of other nations and not sit as an
overseer to their actions taken within their boundaries.159 Union Texas Pe-
troleum (UTP) contracted with Pluspetrol for a joint offshore drilling bid
that gave Pluspetrol the right to take up to ten percent of UTP's interest, if
UTP won the bid. UTP got the contract for offshore drilling, off the Ivory
Coast in Africa. The Ivory Coast Minister of Mines, however, refused to
recognize Pluspetrol's claim to 10% of the oil and gas concession, explaining
that the Ivorian Government did not want partners participating in the con-
cession with less than a 15% share. UTP asked the Ivorian Government to
reconsider, but it refused. Pluspetrol assigned its claim against UTP to Duff,
who then sued for breach of the agreement. UTP pleaded that Ivory Coast
law required them to breach the agreement with Pluspetrol, and that the act
of state doctrine required the court to acknowledge the Ivory Coast Govern-
ment's action. The Texas trial court disagreed with UTP and held that there
had been no act of state that required UTP's breach. The court of appeals
affirmed, noting that the act of state doctrine is merely "a judicially created
doctrine of restraint"' 6 that did not apply to the instant case because the
Ivory Coast was not a party, and that Duff was not challenging the validity
of a foreign government's expropriation of this property. The court further
noted that the facts did not parallel other cases involving the act of state
doctrine. 161 The court of appeals erred in holding that the act of state doc-
trine is limited to the challenging of the validity of a foreign government's
expropriation of property.' 62 No harm was done in the instant case, how-
ever, because the same result would have been reached had the act of state
doctrine been applied, since the court also found that plaintiff suffered no
damages.1 63
156. Id. at 771 (citing TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.067 (Vernon 1986)).
157. Id.
158. 770 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
159. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
160. Duff, 770 S.W.2d at 621.
161. Id.
162. See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938)
(New York Court of Appeals applied act of state doctrine as defense to breach of contract
under similar facts).




In Daugherty v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 164 the Texas Supreme
Court held that it was not a prerequisite that a party plead another state's
law or regulation before the Texas courts could take judicial notice of it.165
The court specifically stated that a trial court is not required to take judicial
notice of federal laws and regulations, however, because it is within the
court's discretion to determine if the notice requirement of Texas Rules of
Civil Evidence 202 had been met. 166
In this suit for wrongful death, plaintiff requested that the trial court take
judicial notice of federal Occupational, Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) regulations. 167 The trial court refused to take notice because the
regulations had not been plead by the plaintiffs. In declining to require
Texas courts to take notice of federal law, the supreme court invalidated a
long line of Texas appellate cases,168 as well as the overwhelming body of
authority throughout the United States.1 69 The supreme court relied in part
on Tippett v. Hart,170 in which it had earlier stated that Texas courts were
not obligated to take judicial notice of federal laws and regulations.17 1 Tip-
pett held that a requirement which mandated Texas courts to take notice of
such laws and regulations was unnecessary and overbroad 1 72
In Daugherty, the Texas Supreme Court also noted that the language of
Texas Rule of Evidence 202 required documentation of the federal regula-
tions as a condition of judicial notice. 173 The Texas evidentiary rule address-
ing judicial notice expressly included in its purview of acceptable judicial
notice subjects the laws of the sister states.174 It is the position of the au-
thors that because federal law is not foreign to Texas, it is not addressed by
Texas Rule of Evidence 202. Daugherty may be correct in holding that a
party wishing to obtain judicial notice of federal law must produce copies of
such laws, especially for federal regulations that may not be readily available
to the state trial court or the opposing counsel. Daugherty probably goes too
164. 772 S.W.2d 81 (rex. 1989).
165. Id. at 83.
166. Id. See infra. note 173 and accompanying text.
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
168. See, eg., Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1978), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980); Lyon Van Lines, Inc.
v. Ogden 503 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1973, no writ).
169. Daugherty, 772 S.W.2d at 83.
170. 501 S.W.2d 874 (rex. 1973).
171. Id. at 875.
172. Id. The clarification by the Supreme Court was in response to a statement made by
the lower court that Texas courts were "required to take judicial notice of the administrative
rules and regulations adopted by all federal departments, boards and commissions pursuant to
statute. Id. (citing Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ
denied)).
173. Daugherty v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (rex. 1989). The perti-
nent part of Texas Rule of Evidence 202 states: "A party requesting that judicial notice be
taken of such matter shall furnish the court sufficient information to enable it properly to
comply with the request, and shall give all parties such notice, if any, as the court may deem
necessary." TEx. R. CIV. EVID. 202.
174. TEx. R. Cv. EviD. 202.
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far, however, in holding that Texas courts may refuse to take judicial notice
of federal law if they determine that Texas Rule of Evidence 202 has not
been met.
In Jackson v. S. P. Leasing Corp. 175 the court of appeals held that the
Jones Act 176 precluded a foreign seaman's lawsuit for injuries sustained in
another country's territorial waters. Plaintiff Jackson, a Honduran seaman,
sued for injuries he suffered while working aboard an American-owned ves-
sel for a Panamanian corporation. The injuries occurred while the vessel
was in the territorial waters of Mexico. Jackson brought his action under
the Jones Act but argued on appeal that the Texas Open Forum Act con-
trolled the case.177 The Texas Open Forum Act allows claims to be brought
in the Texas courts for personal injuries suffered by foreign citizens in a
foreign country. The court stated in dicta that the Jones Act preempted the
Texas Open Forum Act. 178 The court noted that a 1982 amendment to the
Jones Act was designed to preclude foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping in
the United States. 179 The court also found that the preemption under the
Jones Act did not deny due process or equal protection to Jackson. 80
The court in Brown Services, Inc v. Fairbrother1 I addressed the specific-
ity required when pleading choice of law. Fairbrother was injured while
working on a derrick in Trinidad's territorial waters. His petition, filed in
Texas district court, claimed relief under "general maritime law, the Jones
Act'182 . . . 'any and all other applicable law.' "s183 The trial court applied
Texas workers compensation law. Defendant Brown Services appealed,
claiming that Texas law was not properly plead.18 4 The court of appeals
held that pleading "any and all other applicable law" was sufficient notice of
plaintiff's intent to claim under Texas law or any other law that would sup-
port a judgment in his favor.18 5 The court further held that if the pleading
175. 774 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ granted).
176. 46 U.S.C. § 688(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
177. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986).
178. Jackson, 774 S.W.2d at 675.
179. Id.
In short, [the 1982 amendment] denies a Jones Act remedy and any other reme-
dies under general maritime law to a foreign seaman in the offshore drilling
industry when the seaman is injured in another country's territorial waters, tin-
less neither the country where the injury occurred nor the seaman's home coun-
try provides a remedy.
Jackson, 774 at 675 (citing Camejo v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration, 838 F.2d 1374, 1376-77
(5th Cir. 1988)). Jackson's suit was brought solely under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688).
That act specifically denies a remedy to foreign seamen who are injured while working on
offshore drilling rigs. Because Jackson based his claim on this Act and did not plead or present
the Texas Open Forum Act claim, TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon
1986), at the trial court, the Texas Open Form Act claim was not considered.
180. Id. at 675-76.
181. 776 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
182. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982'& Supp. III 1985).
183. Fairbrother, 776 S.W.2d at 773.
184. It should be recognized that defendant failed to make a special exception at trial to the
application for worker's compensation laws. The court stated that "in the absence of special
exceptions, the petition will be liberally construed to support the judgment." Id. at 774.
185. Id. at 775.
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was defective, the defects must be raised by special exception at trial in order
to be considered on appeal.18 6 Reaching the opposite conclusion, Knops v.
Knops18 7 held that defendant's motion requesting the court to take judicial
notice of "the common law, public statutes and court decisions of the state
of New Mexico" was insufficient. 188
IV. FoREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments of other countries and sister states create Texas con-
flicts of laws in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their preclu-
sive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include sister state and
foreign country judgments, but do not include federal court judgments from
other states, because those judgments are enforced as local federal court
judgments.1 8 9 Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judg-
ments: the common law method of using the foreign judgment as the basis of
a local lawsuit,19 0 and the more direct procedure under the uniform foreign
judgments acts.
A. Enforcement
Since 1981 Texas has used two uniform acts to recognize and enforce for-
eign judgments, although their adoption did not displace the common law
enforcement method. 19 1 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act (UEFJA)192 provides for Texas enforcement of non-Texas judgments
that are entitled to full faith and credit. This includes sister judgments as
well as foreign country money judgments that Texas recognizes under the
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act (UFCM-
JRA).193 The legislature recodified both acts in 1985 and incorporated them
into the Civil Practice and Remedies Code with no significant changes.
The most significant case in this Survey period is Plastics Engineering Inc.
v. Diamond Plastics Corp.1 94 in which another court of appeals held the
UFCMJRA unconstitutional.1 9 5 The court held that the UFCMJRA's fail-
ure to provide for a plenary hearing in which the defendant can challenge
the recognition of a foreign judgment violated due process requirements. 196
186. Id. at 774.
187. 763 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
188. Id. at 867.
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
190. The underlying mandate for common law enforcement is the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act
specifically reserves the common law method as an alternative. See TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1986). There were no pertinent cases during the Survey period.
See George and Pedersen; Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.. 383, 430-
33 (1987).
191. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1986).
192. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-35.007 (Vernon 1986).
193. TEx. Cxv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-36.008 (Vernon 1986 and Vernon
Supp. 1990).
194. 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).




The court noted the lack of authority interpreting the UFCMJRA and ex-
amined the only two cases that have considered this question. 9 7 In Hen-
nessy v. Marshall 98 the Dallas court of appeals was faced with the issue of
recognizing an English default judgment. Because UFCMJRA provided no
means of challenging this judgment, the Hennessy court inferred the drafters'
intent that UFCMJRA section 36.005 provided for a plenary hearing.199 In
Detamore v. Sullivan 200 the court of appeals disagreed with Hennessy and
held that the UFCMJRA's lack of an express hearing provision rendered it
unconstitutional. 20' The Detamore court believed that inferring the right to
a plenary hearing was improper judicial legislation.202 The Plastics Engi-
neering court concurred with Detamore and held the UFCMJRA unconsti-
tutional. 20 3 Although the court did not discuss the judgment creditor's
recourse, the judgment creditor would be entitled to file a common law ac-
tion and presumably use the foreign action for summary judgment based on
resjudicata. Late in the Survey period, yet another court of appeals held the
UFCMJRA unconstitutional on identical grounds in Don Docksteader Mo-
tors Ltd. v. Patel Enterprises.2°4
Hill Country Spring Water, Ina v. Krug 205 offers a good discussion of
challenging the jurisdiction of the sister state in which the foreign judgment
was rendered. The court noted that a defendant against whom a sister state
judgment has been filed under the UEFJA may challenge the sister state's
jurisdiction by showing that service of process was defective under the law of
the other state, 20 6 or by proving that he was not subject to in personam
jurisdiction in that state.20 7 The foreign judgment at issue was entered in
Ohio. The court, therefore, examined both Ohio's service and defendant's
amenability to jurisdiction there, and found both to be in order.208
Defendant Hill Country Spring Water also challenged the constitutional-
ity of the UEFJA on the same grounds under which the UFCMJRA was
held unconstitutional, that is, because it failed to provide a hearing in which
defendant could assert his defenses. The court held that it would not con-
sider the validity of the UEFJA where the defendant had suffered no
harm.209 At the trial court level, the defendant had obtained a temporary
restraining order, filed a petition to set aside the judgment, an application to
stay the judgment, and a motion for summary judgment. According to the
court of appeals, these procedural devices negated defendant's claim that
197. Id. at 925.
198. 682 S.W.2d 340 (rex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
199. Plastics Eng., 764 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Hennessy, 682 S.W.2d at 343).
200. 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
201. Plastics Eng., 764 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Detamore, 731 S.W.2d at 122).
202. Detamore, 731 S.W.2d at 1248).
203. Id.
204. 776 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted.)
205. 773 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
206. Id. at 639.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 639-40.
209. Id. at 641.
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there was no means of challenging the judgment under the UEFJA.210 One
would assume that these same procedural devices were also available to the
defendants in the Detamore and Plastics Engineering cases.
In addition to the general uniform acts discussed above, the Revised Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) 211 provides more
specifically for the enforcement of sister-state child support judgments. Nu-
nez v. Nunez 212 involved a husband who moved to Texas, followed by the
wife's registration of an Illinois judgment ordering child support. The Illi-
nois judgment identified three children of the marriage, all under eighteen
years old. The settlement agreement attached to the Illinois judgment re-
ferred to the three children, but stated that support would only be paid for
the two minor children. An Agreed Order to Modify Child Support stated
that child support would be paid for the "minor children" of the marriage.
The husband argued that the foreign order was fatally vague. The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that the husband was required to pay support for
all three children under the full faith and credit clause.213 The husband's
only defenses would be those relating to the original decree, such as proce-
dural defects or lack of jurisdiction.214 The court further held that it had
jurisdiction to confirm the Illinois support order even though one child for
which support was due had reached eighteen.215
B. Preclusion
The United States Constitution requires that Texas courts give full faith
and credit to the judicial proceedings of sister states.216 In addition to pro-
viding the basis for enforcing sister state judgments in Texas, the full faith
and credit clause precludes relitigation of legal issues or claims in Texas
Courts through the doctrine of res judicata.217 Under stricter standards,
preclusion is extended to foreign country judgments according to the long-
standing policy against repetitive litigation. The 1989 Survey period pro-
duced no significant cases regarding preclusion.
210. Id.
211. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-21.43 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
212, 771 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
213. Id. at 9-10.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Id.
216. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
217. Resjudicata includes claim preclusion (merger and bar) and issue preclusion (direct
and collateral estoppel).
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